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ABSTRACT
Why did Brazil and Venezuela choose different exchange rate policies in 2003?
Brazilian President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva chose to maintain the managed float
established by his predecessor; Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez chose to switch to a
fixed exchange rate. Economic explanations typically consider structural factors drawn
from Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory as well as macroeconomic indicators such
as level of reserves and inflation. Political explanations examine regime type,
parliamentary structure, and interest groups. This study further explores the role of
interest groups in determining exchange rate policy choice. Existing research on interest
groups focuses primarily on major economic sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing,
finance, and multi-national corporations while downplaying the average worker. This
study proposes a theory of exchange rate policy preferences that takes into account the
average person’s dual role as employee and consumer. It tests the hypothesis that the
balance of interest groups reflected the governments’ actual exchange rate policy choices
in 2003. It tests this hypothesis first without taking into account the workers and second
after taking them into account. It finds that the hypothesis is rejected in the case of Brazil
and confirmed in the case of Venezuela, and in neither case did the inclusion of the
workers change the result. This implies that the proposed theory about the exchange rate
preference of the workers could be flawed. It also implies that interest-group theories of
exchange rate policy choice, in light of being applied to the most recent era of the rise of
the New Left in Latin America, need more revision and clarification.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
In 2003, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva decided to maintain the
floating exchange rate policy and inflation-targeting monetary framework of his
predecessor and long-time political opponent, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The same
year, President Hugo Chávez announced that Venezuela would switch from floating rates
to a fixed exchange rate with capital controls. Why did these two governments, both part
of Latin America’s progressive wave known as the New Left, choose different exchange
rate policies?
The question of whether to fix or float the exchange rate appears simple, but
explaining the choice is perplexing. Empirical evidence shows that both fixed and
floating rates have been associated with financial crises, financial stabilization, and a
range of political regimes. The fixed exchange rate was part of the neoliberal stabilization
programs in Argentina in 1991 and Brazil in 1993, but it has also been part of
Venezuela’s drive toward 21st Century Socialism. Conversely, the floating exchange rate
was a key part of Venezuela’s neoliberal stabilization program in 1989, yet floating rates
have long been associated with instability in the region, leading many countries with
floats to continue intervening heavily in currency markets because of a so-called “fear of
floating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). The political ideology of the government appears
irrelevant, as well. Governments on the political right and left in Latin America use the
same exchange rate policy: Panama and Ecuador use the dollar, Honduras and Nicaragua
use the crawling peg, Colombia and Brazil use the managed float, and Mexico and
Uruguay use the free float. Within the New Left, Brazil is considered more conservative
and Venezuela more radical, but this distinction only leads to further confusion regarding
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exchange rate policy. This is because the more radical government chose the exchange
rate policy that is normally associated with international financial interests, monetarism,
austerity, and stability, whereas the more conservative government chose the policy
associated with instability, countercyclical government intervention, and inflation.
This study examines the role of interest groups in determining exchange rate
policy choice. Evidence suggests that manufacturers and agricultural producers involved
in trade prefer floating exchange rates in order to remain competitive in global markets,
and that international financial interests as well as capital-intensive industries tend to
prefer the stability, low inflation, and appreciation associated with fixed rates. Existing
interest group theories, however, downplay the important role played by the average
people who work, consume, and vote, but do not own large businesses, make major
investments, or exert inordinate political influence. This group is referred to in this study
interchangeably as the workers, popular sectors, and lower classes. Members of this
group are usually considered in one of two ways. As workers, they are assumed to share
the exchange rate policy preference of their employer. Alternatively, as consumers and
voters, they are assumed always to prefer a stronger currency and to lure governments
toward irresponsible policies that lead to currency appreciation prior to elections. Either
way, the general public is considered peripheral to the choice of exchange rate policy.
Integral to the rise of the New Left in Latin America has been the increased
political engagement of the popular sectors. Indeed, the election of Chávez, Lula, and
many others reflected the growing power of new social movements clamoring for broader
and deeper democracy. Therefore, theories of interest group politics need to take into
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account the populations that were long marginalized by Latin America’s authoritarian
regimes and populist republics.
This study proposes a theory of the lower classes’ exchange rate policy
preference. Its premise is that individuals are both workers and consumers
simultaneously. Higher unemployment motivates workers to support a floating exchange
rate to allow for economic stimulus; higher poverty and inequality motivate consumers to
favor fixed exchange rates to guard their real incomes and savings. Since unemployment,
poverty, and inequality often rise simultaneously, the balance-tipper is the level of
enfranchisement, or the feeling of security and protection in one’s workplace and polity.
Enfranchisement, which rises with union density and the size of the formal economy,
increases tolerance for the uncertainty and inflation associated with floating rates. This
study posits that it is possible to discern the lower classes’ policy preference by finding
the net balance of all of these factors.
In order to find out whether taking into account the popular sectors’ exchange rate
policy preference makes a difference in explaining exchange rate policy choice, this
study tests its hypothesis first without considering the popular sectors, then it tests the
same hypothesis after including the popular sectors in the assessment of the interest
groups. The hypothesis, drawn from existing interest-group theories, is that the
configuration of interest groups in Brazil and Venezuela in 2003 reflected the
governments’ exchange rate policy decisions.
Usually, research on this topic employs a longitudinal analysis of a large-N
sample of cross-country data. This study, in contrast, employs a cross-sectional analysis
using case studies. It uses both descriptive statistics and detailed qualitative description to
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assess the balance of interest groups at the time each government chose its exchange rate
policy in early 2003.
The study finds that the hypothesis holds in the case of Venezuela and is rejected
in the case of Brazil. In both cases, the consideration of the workers’ policy preference
does not change the result. This carries four implications for future research: crosssectional case studies should accompany large-N longitudinal analyses, researchers
should continue seeking an accurate concept of the popular sectors’ policy preferences,
the eight postulates taken for granted in this study should be further interrogated, and
more consideration should be given to institutional context and government ideology.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
The Latin American New Left
The rise of Latin America’s New Left ran contrary to conventional wisdom.
When the Cold War ended, observers of global affairs, most notably Francis Fukuyama
(1989), declared triumphantly that western-style capitalism was the unrivaled model for
economic development and was destined to proliferate across the globe. The prediction
appeared to be coming true by the mid-1990s, when every Latin American country except
Cuba had declared its intention to step into line with the US-led agenda for a Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA) (Smith, 2002). Just a few years later, however, Venezuela
elected President Hugo Chávez, and over the subsequent decade progressive presidents
were elected in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua,
Paraguay, and Uruguay. Even before this rising progressive tide had reached its peak,
observers were asking whether the US had “lost” the region (Hakim, 2006).
Although the wave of elected governments elected after 1998 were mostly left or
center-left, some argue that the Latin American New Left has differed little from the past.
Queirolo (2013), for example, argues that voters have always focused on results, not
specific policies, and they have rejected governments that fail to improve their lives,
regardless of ideology. From this perspective, the so-called New Left is merely a string of
governments, most but not all leftist, riding waves of popular discontent. The weakness in
Queirolo’s argument, however, is that it does not adequately distinguish between the
negative consequences of market reforms during the 1990s and the market reforms
themselves, so the contention that voters rejected the results but not the policies stands on
weak ground.
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Castañeda (2006) also downplays the significance of the New Left. He divides the
so-called new-left governments into two camps. One is called the “right left”, which
includes Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay. It is “right” in Castañeda’s view because its leaders,
who are former leftists, have matured and learned not to be leftist anymore: they embrace
capitalist markets, accept strong US influence in the hemisphere, and curtail programs
that would empower and improve the living standards of the poor. The other camp is
called the “wrong left”, which includes Argentina, Venezuela, and Bolivia. These
countries are “nationalist, strident, and close-minded” (p. 29), and they are simply
rehashing policies that are “about as close to traditional Latin American populism as one
can get” (p. 41). In Castañeda’s view, a country can be leftist and cling to failed past
ideologies, or it can be “right”. Either way, the implication is there no such thing as a
“new” left. Despite its popularity, Castañeda’s analysis is simplistic as well as inaccurate:
it ignores the similarities between his two camps, the differences between the New Left
and previous populist governments, and the unique qualities of each country’s experience
(Cameron, 2009; Young, 2014; Ciccariello, 2014).
The New Left exists and has complex tendencies within it (Vilas, 2006; Barret et
al., 2008; Cameron and Hershberg, 2010; Flores-Macias, 2012; Levitsky and Roberts,
2011; Webber and Carr, 2013; Ellner, 2014). Most research acknowledges unique
features in every new-left government while also categorizing these governments. One
broad approach to categorization focuses on policies and institutions. For example, most
scholars note that new-left governments are similar in that they have abdicated armed
revolution and adopted the peaceful, electoral path to power. These governments differ,
however, in the institutional context of their rise to power. Specifically, as Levitsky and
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Roberts (2011) describe in detail, new-left governments differ on whether authority is
centralized or decentralized, whether they came to power from within an institutionalized
political system or from outside the establishment, and the unique historical trajectories
of the movements that brought them to power. These institutional factors lead to distinct
policy choices, which are generally organized along a scale that slides from liberal to
radical. More liberal governments, such as Brazil, accept market principles to a larger
degree, use a limited tool box of redistributionist income support programs, and have
representative democratic institutions; more radical governments, such as Venezuela,
support more economic coordination, use a broader array of social programs, promote
egalitarian relations in the workplace, and push for a participatory democracy with new
avenues of engagement for social movements.
Another broad approach to the New Left is to focus on the power dynamics
among different social groups. In this view, exemplified by many of the authors in
Webber and Carr (2013) and by Ciccariello (2014) and Beasley-Murray (2010), the
policies and institutions of new-left governments are “constituted power,” which is
epiphenomenal to “constituent power,” also referred to as the correlation of social forces.
That is to say, the shift in relative power among economic actors such as industrial
capitalists, financiers, and the working class drives change in economic and political
structures. This power interplay is inherently unstable: a dominant group may for a time
achieve the illusion of a social pact, but eventually the pact will be shaken by the selfassertion of new social groups. For example, as Ciccariello and Beasley-Murray point
out, the spontaneous, leaderless, mass demonstrations against neoliberal reforms in
Venezuela in 1989, known as the Caracazo, were indicative of a new shift in constituent
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power, a precursor to the rise of Chávez to the presidency. And as Katz (2013) describes,
during the 1990s, neoliberal reforms weakened industrial capitalists, banking crises
weakened financiers, and wars in the Middle East distracted the U.S., opening space for a
new array of social movements led by indigenous peoples, rural laborers, women, and the
marginal urban poor. Most authors acknowledge that in Latin America these diverse
sectors have united to some extent to support new-left governments, in what has come to
be known as the “pobretariado” – a fusion of the words “poor” and “proletariat” (Barret
et al., 2008, p. 7). From this broad approach, the central question is how these new social
actors can retain autonomy from the state while also influencing and changing state
power, and how to balance the alacrity of centralization and unity with the principled
authenticity and organic democracy of pluralist autonomy.1 Authors writing from this
perspective, such as Cameron and Hershberg (2010), see the cross-country comparisons
among Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and cross-movement comparisons as well, as
more important than the dichotomy between the policies and institutions of Brazil and
Venezuela.
Exchange Rate Policies
Exchange rate policy is highly relevant to any discussion of economic policy in
Latin America. The exchange rate bears direct influence on a nation’s ability to trade,
invest abroad or receive foreign capital, and adjust smoothly to international economic
fluctuations. The government’s exchange rate policy – its decision to use fixed or floating
exchange rates – is an essential tool for maintaining external and internal economic
balance. When combined with other macroeconomic policies, exchange rate policy is a

1

Several chapters in the collections edited by Ellner (2014) and by Webber and Carr (2013) state these
questions in different forms.
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core feature of a country’s economic development model and its mode of insertion into
the international system. In Latin America particularly, exchange rates were central to the
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) model of development that was carried out
roughly between 1930-1970. The phenomenon known as the “Dutch disease,” where
countries that specialize in exporting basic commodities face structural blockages to
industrialization, is closely related to the movement of real exchange rates. Throughout
Latin America’s debt crises of the 1980s and financial crises of the 1990s, likewise,
exchange rates were central to the policy discussion. Exchange rates are even more
relevant in the age of globalization, since protectionist trade policies are being rolled back
at the same time as global capital movements are increasing in volume and velocity.
The exchange rate is the price of a currency in terms of other currencies, and it
influences the prices of all other goods and services in open economies. In the event of an
imbalance of trade between nations, the exchange rate helps determine how much
liquidity is available to finance deficits, and who will bear the costs of re-balancing trade.
Exchange rate policies include hard pegs, soft pegs, and floating rates (see Table 1).
These are closely intertwined with capital controls, monetary policy, and fiscal policy in
a complex interplay known as the “trilemma,” which says governments cannot
simultaneously maintain stable exchange rates, free capital movement, and monetary
autonomy.2
IMF members annually report their official exchange rate policy, known as the de
jure policy. The IMF then makes a de facto classification based on its own assessment of
empirical evidence, which sometimes differs from the de jure policy (IMF 2014).

2

The trilemma, also known as the irreconcilable trinity, is discussed in a variety of major texts related to
international economics, including Franko (2007), Todaro and Smith (2009), and Gilpin (2000).
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Researchers have proposed alternative methods of de facto classification in efforts to
better capture the complexity of contemporary exchange rate policies. For example,
Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) propose a method that accounts for parallel market
transactions and adds a category titled “freely falling,” which is reserved for any
economy with annual inflation above 40 percent. The authors urge greater attention to de
facto policies over de jure policies, alleging that official pegs are often de facto crawling
pegs or floats, and official floats may sometimes behave more like pegs.
Although scholars generally agree on what the exchange rate policy alternatives
are, they offer diverse interpretations of global trends in exchange rate policy choices.
The “fear of floating” theory says countries are gravitating toward soft pegs, also known
as intermediate exchange rate policies (Poirson, 2001). In contrast, the bipolar theory
says intermediate policies have proven unsustainable and countries are gravitating toward
the extremes of hard pegs and free floats (Fischer, 2001; Papaioannou, 2003).
Eichengreen, Garcia, and Corsetti (2006) say both of these theories are correct to an
extent: developed countries are moving toward the extremes, developing countries are
moving toward soft pegs, and emerging economies are choosing both intermediate and
managed floating policies. Frankel (1999) and Yagci (2004) emphasize the uniqueness of
each country’s political context, arguing that “no single exchange rate regime is best for
all countries or at all times.” Others have concluded that exchange rate policies are
irrelevant. Rose (2011) concludes that the choice of exchange rate policy is as trivial as
the choice between coffee or tea; Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) call fixed exchange rates a
“mirage,” since global capital markets have become so powerful that they render
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government intervention ineffective. All in all, existing research is inconclusive, and
further work is needed.

Floating Rates

Soft Pegs

Hard Pegs

Table 1. Exchange Rate Policy Types
Policy Type
Description
A foreign currency, such as the U.S. dollar, is the legal
No National Currency/
tender. The government sacrifices the ability to print
Monetary Union
currency, be a lender of last resort, or set interest rates.
Another form is a monetary union such the Eurozone.
The government declares an official rate of exchange with a
designated foreign currency or basket of currencies, then
Currency Board
commits to exchange domestic currency at this rate upon
demand and not to print currency unless backed by the
designated foreign currency.
The government declares an official rate of exchange with a
foreign currency or basket of currencies, then it commits to
intervene in currency markets to maintain the exchange rate.
Conventional Peg
This intervention may take many forms, among them open
market transactions, controls on capital flows, and taxation.
Fiscal deficits must be avoided.
The effect a conventional peg – maximum fluctuations of
plus or minus two percent in spot markets – is achieved
Stabilized Arrangement
without a formal declaration of a conventional peg or a legal
commitment to maintain that rate.
The government commits to a fixed rate as in a conventional
peg, but it commits to maintain that rate within a range
Peg with Horizontal Bands
greater than plus or minus two percent, allowing greater
leeway to devalue or revalue the official rate as needed.
The government establishes a fixed exchange rate but
declares its intent to adjust this rate according to publicly
known guidelines and parameters such as inflation parity
Crawling Peg
with trading partners or domestic macroeconomic indicators.
The rate may be set deliberately above or below the market
rate.
The effect of a crawling peg is achieved without a formal
Crawl-like Arrangement
declaration of a crawling peg or a set of guidelines for rate
adjustment.
Market transactions determine the exchange rate, but the
government intervenes periodically – without a regular
Managed Float
schedule – to respond to crises or prevent destabilizing
market fluctuations.
Market transactions determine the exchange rate, and
Free Float
government interventions last fewer than three days and
occur less than three times per six months.
Sources: IMF, 2014; Habermeier et al., 2009; Sozovska, 2004
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Explanations of Exchange Rate Policy Choice
There are two broad approaches to explaining exchange rate policies: the
economic approach, which assumes rational market conditions and looks at economic
variables, and the political approach, which assumes a power struggle among conflicting
interests and looks at political variables. Both approaches present some robust findings.
However, as Klein and Shambaugh (2010) assert in their summary of the existing
literature, “there is little that can contribute to our understanding of when a country pegs
rather than floats” (p. 95).
The economic approach to explaining exchange rate policy choice begins with
efforts to deduce the ideal exchange rate policy, given free market conditions. Fixed rates
are thought to have several advantages: they facilitate trade by reducing price uncertainty
and transaction costs; lower inflation by disciplining fiscal and monetary policies and
controlling import prices; and compel structural adjustment to trade imbalances. The
drawbacks of fixed rates are the costs of maintaining the credibility of the policy, which
include sacrificing monetary policy autonomy and suffering through the contraction of
the real economy (Klein and Shambaugh, 2010, p. 17-20; Poirson, 2001, p. 26; Frank,
2007, p. 120; Bird 1998; Setser 2007). Floating exchange rates, in contrast, allow the
external sector to absorb the impact of adjustment, thus avoiding real economic
contraction, loss of reserves, or monetary tightening (Friedman, 1953; 1967; 1970).
However, floating rates are vulnerable to speculative attack. They also lead to higher
inflation, allow countries to postpone necessary structural adjustment, and discourage
trade because of their volatility, according to critics. Advocates of intermediate exchange
rate policies, such as crawling pegs and crawling bands, claim they combine the stability
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of fixed rates with the flexibility of the float (ECLAC, 2012; Sunkel, 1993; Williamson,
2000; 2010); others argue that intermediate policies combine the vices of both floating
and fixed rates and contributed to the financial collapses of the 1990s (Fischer, 2001;
Kiguel and O’Connell 1995).
To explain exchange rate policy choice, one common set of independent variables
is drawn from Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory (Mundell, 1961). According to this
theory, fixed exchange rates are most viable within areas where there is full mobility of
the factors of production, and trade across these areas should be carried out with floating
rates. Overall, OCA theory expects smaller, more open countries with diverse export
products to peg their currencies with countries that are geographically proximate and
experience similar external shocks and business cycles (Collins, 1995; Papaioannou
2003; Poirson, 2001; Sozovska, 2004; Yagci, 2001). One of the most consistent findings
in the economic literature is that fixed rates are positively correlated with proximity to the
peg country or former colonial relationship (Klein and Shambaugh, 2010).
Some macroeconomic indicators appear to influence exchange rate policy. Those
bearing consistently robust results are inflation and the real exchange rate, with fixed
rates being associated with lower inflation and real appreciation (Jameson, 2002; Poirson,
2001; Bleaney and Francisco (2007). Studies differ on whether fixed or floating rates
have an impact on GDP (Papaioannou, 2003; Bleaney and Francisco 2007). Most
hypotheses predict that fixed rates will be chosen in countries with higher levels of
reserves, capital controls, and foreign debt liabilities; lower volatility in the terms of trade
and the current account; and a controlled money supply (Papaioannou, 2003; Piragic and
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Jameson, 2005; Sozovka, 2004; Yagci, 2001). However, empirical results are mixed
(Jameson, 2002).
In summary, the economic approach has been unable to discern the ideal
exchange rate policy and the determinants of exchange rate policy choice. All authors
cited above acknowledge that in addition to economic factors, politics influence exchange
rate choice to some degree.
Several scholars who take the political approach have criticized the economic
approach for treating the government as a discrete unit with an exogenous exchange rate
policy preference (Frieden, Ghezzi, and Stein, 2001, p. 6; Leblang, 1999, p. 601;
Bernhard and Leblang, 1999, p. 72-73). They claim to correct this flaw by showing that
economic policy decisions result from power struggles rather than rational market
principles. The government, rather than being neutral and welfare-maximizing, is a
political battleground contested by actors whose interests conflict.
A classical version of the political approach is Marxian historical materialism,
which says that dialectical class contradictions within the institutional structure based on
the “social relations of production” drive historical change (Peet & Hartwick, p. 91-107).
The political approach is also present in the realist school. For example, Kirshner (2003),
writes that money and politics are hinged: “money rules” but is subservient to “political
masters” (p. 657). The process of making rules to govern money always involves
tradeoffs among the interests of social groups. According to Gilpin (2000), just as the
trilemma represents the tradeoffs among economic objectives, distributional conflict
among interest groups represents the tradeoffs among political forces integral to any
global monetary framework (p. 121-122).
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Latin American structuralism, developed by the Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in the 20th Century, has contributed greatly to
exchange rate politics in the region. Structuralist authors posit that Latin American
countries face structural blockages to industrialization because of declining terms of trade
as a result of dependence on primary commodity exports; this colonial legacy creates a
duality of modern and traditional practices that can only be overcome through active
political intervention (Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1970). The structuralists have prescribed a
range of fixed, crawling, and multiple exchange rates combined with direct state
participation in production, trade, interest rates, and labor intermediation in order to
channel investment toward secondary-sector production for the domestic market.
Structuralists have also examined interest group configurations specific to Latin
American countries, including distinct types of capitalist classes, rural elites, and labor
organizations (Furtado, 1965). Cardoso, the sociologist and future Brazilian president, in
his theory of historical structuralism, emphasizes the unique conditions in each country,
specifying economic structures and interpositions of exporters, importers, financiers,
landowners, industrialists, professionals, and popular sectors (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979).
More recently, Latin American theorists have developed neostructuralism to revive the
systemic and structural critique while recognizing a balanced role for both state
intervention, export-based growth, and rational market principles (Sunkel, 1993; ECLAC,
2012).
Research in the past two decades has examined the impact of interest groups on
exchange rate policy (Hefeker, 1996; Frieden and Stein, 2001; Frieden, Ghezzi, and
Stein, 2001; Jameson, 2003; Hira and Dean, 2004; Piragic and Jameson, 2005; Broz,
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Frieden, and Weymouth, 2008; Frieden, 2015). In the most recent work, Frieden argues
that unlike some policies that can benefit all stakeholders, exchange rate policy is
“entirely [original italics] the result of political economy factors,” since it has no general
welfare effect and always yields winners and losers (2015, p. 8). It is fundamentally a
choice between fixed rates, which yield policy credibility, stability, and appreciation; and
floating rates, which yield policy flexibility and price competitiveness due to
depreciation. Even though interest groups may see benefits and drawbacks in both
policies, they ultimately prefer one or the other, according to Frieden. For example,
manufacturers that trade care about both stability and competitiveness, but ultimately
their sensitivity to real appreciation prevails (Broz, Frieden, and Weymouth, 2008, p.
440). These preferences vary according to the tradibility of inputs and outputs. Producers
who use nontradable inputs to produce tradable outputs will prefer a depreciated
currency; those that use tradable inputs to produce nontradable outputs will prefer an
appreciated currency. For example, mining firms that depend on imported capital goods
prefer currency appreciation (Frieden, Ghezzi, and Stein, 2001, p. 18-19). Similarly,
investors with foreign-denominated assets prefer a depreciated currency; those with
foreign-denominated debts prefer an appreciated currency. Interest group preferences are
also influenced by “pass-through,” or the extent to which a change in the exchange rate
affects prices in their industry. Exporters of primary commodities such as wheat or iron,
in which pass-through is complete because the market is highly competitive and demand
is relatively elastic, will prefer depreciation in order to remain competitive. In contrast,
exporters of high-technology goods, the demand for which is relatively inelastic, prefer
stable, fixed rates, and the value of the currency is less important (Frieden, 2015, p. 35).
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Most scholars agree that the expansion of democracy changes interest-group
dynamics by enfranchising new social groups that place demands on the government.
However, scholars disagree on the exchange rate preferences of these new groups. One
hypothesis is that newly enfranchised voters are mainly concerned with inflation, which
reduces real incomes, so policymakers seeking re-election will feel pressure to choose
fixed, appreciated exchange rates (Hefeker, 1996; Bonomo and Terra, 2001; Frieden,
Ghezzi, and Stein, 2001; Frieden, 2015). As Bonomo and Terra explain, the public is
larger in number and dispersed and the business interests that would lose competitiveness
are small and concentrated, so it is easier to accede to the public on exchange rate policy
and compensate the business sector through other targeted mechanisms. One robust
finding suggests that the public’s preference does prevail around election time, since real
exchange rates tend to appreciate in the months preceding elections and then depreciate
after the election (Frieden, Ghezzi, and Stein, 2001).
An alternative view, argued by Leblang (1999), is that fiscal and monetary policy
are key tools for winning votes, so policymakers competing for re-election will prefer
floating rates, which allow more policy flexibility. Implicit in this argument is that voters
are concerned less with inflation than with employment and government services, which
can be expanded using counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies.
Another political factor that may affect exchange rate policy is whether the
electoral system is majoritarian or proportional representation. The key factors at play are
the amount of competing demands made on the government and the costs of losing
power. Proportional representation systems increase the competing demands on the
government but decrease the costs of electoral defeat, since the opposition is more
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included in power. Majoritarian systems decrease the competing demands on the
government but increase the costs of defeat, since opposition parties are more excluded
from power. Leblang (1999) finds that in developing countries, proportional
representation systems are associated with floating exchange rates. This suggests that
politicians react to increased demands by seeking to preserve their policy autonomy.
However, Bernhard and Leblang (1999) find that in industrial democracies, majoritarian
systems are associated with floating exchange rates. This suggests incumbents in winnertake-all elections seek to avoid the high cost of electoral defeat by maintaining policy
discretion.
Some studies suggest that policymakers are concerned with the sustainability of
their exchange rate policies. They are more likely to choose fixed exchange rates when
they have sufficient power, resources, and control to sustain the peg. If this is true, then
fixed exchange rates should positively correlate with political stability, level of foreign
reserves, policymakers’ ability to control electoral timing, the level of fragmentation of
the opposition, and the number of seats the governing party holds in the legislature
(Collins, 1995; Edwards, 1996; Poirson, 2001; Papaioannou, 2003; Piragic and Jameson,
2005). An alternative view is that electoral competition blinds politicians to the
sustainability of their policies. Frieden (2015) points out that elections motivate
policymakers to simultaneously enact fixed exchange rates and expansionary fiscal and
monetary policy, which leads to real appreciation and delayed but painful devaluation (p.
242-244).
Exchange rate policy matters greatly to people’s lives, as anyone who has lived
through a currency crisis in Latin America can attest. No single hypothesis reviewed here
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provides a conclusive answer to what determines exchange rate policy. However, several
hypotheses concerning the role of interest groups open a promising path forward and
provide the framework for the remainder of this paper.
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CHAPTER THREE: ARGUMENT AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Existing research over-simplifies the exchange rate policy preferences of the
popular sectors. Whereas the dominant economic groups are assumed to face complex
tradeoffs between the prices of inputs and outputs and the value of assets and liabilities,
the lower classes are treated as an exogenous variable that is mainly relevant during
election cycles. Some assume that workers share the interests of their employers and thus
have the same exchange rate policy preference as the economic sector in which they work
(Hefeker, 1996, p. 366; Frieden, 1991, p. 438). Others, including Frieden (2015), assume
that the lower classes mainly want an appreciated currency to bolster their real incomes.3
In Leblang’s theory, dominant political actors juggle tradeoffs among public demands,
the risk of electoral loss, and policy sustainability; yet it is taken for granted that the
average voter simply wants to reap the benefits of expansionary monetary and fiscal
policy.
This study proposes a more nuanced assessment of the workers’ exchange rate
policy preference. It builds on the research outlined so far, and it follows in the tracks of
Walter (2008), who tries to add more complexity and nuance to the theory of dominant
economic groups’ preference formation. Walter argues that major economic groups take
into account more than just the price competitiveness of their products: they also worry
about their balance sheets. Their policy preference ultimately reflects their “overall
vulnerability,” or the balance of their vulnerabilities to the various policy options (p.
407). For example, a depreciated currency improves the price competitiveness of exports
but may adversely affect corporate balance sheets. Exporters, therefore, will account for
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One exception is Hira and Dean (2004), who articulate the preferences of informal workers and labor
regarding dollarization.
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both of these factors before forming a policy preference. The lower classes’ preferences
should be viewed similarly, since they participate in the economy as both consumers and
employees. As consumers, they benefit from currency appreciation and low inflation, so
they prefer a fixed exchange rate; as employees and job-seekers, they benefit from
expansionary monetary and fiscal policy, so they favor the policy flexibility that comes
with floating rates.
Four factors are at play in the formation of policy preferences by workers:
unemployment, enfranchisement, poverty, and inequality. Unemployed people – those
seeking work who are without a job in either the formal or informal sector – are expected
to prioritize their immediate need for employment over their concern about inflation.
Frenkel and Ros (2006) show that real exchange rate depreciation can lead to greater
levels of employment by increasing demand for exports, labor-intensiveness of the
tradables sector, and foreign exchange earnings available for investment. They argue that
exchange rate appreciation in many Latin American countries during the 1990s
contributed to significant shifts in the economy, including greater unemployment.
Building on this, the present study expects higher unemployment to correspond to a
greater preference for floating rates, which allow for exchange rate depreciation as well
as the policy autonomy necessary to stimulate employment.
Another important factor is the level of enfranchisement. One level of
enfranchisement is formal-sector employment, which often provides some degree of
social protection, such as severance and overtime pay, regulations on safe working
conditions, more secure contracts, and sometimes the right to short-time work rather than
firing during cyclical downturns. Another level of enfranchisement is union membership.
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Although research on the exchange rate policy preference of unions is scarce, some
research shows that labor unions increase or moderate their wage demands under
different exchange rate policy regimes. In open economies with fixed exchange rates,
which allow no devaluation buffer or monetary policy autonomy, labor unions face the
tradeoff between higher wages and employment, therefore they are more restrained in
their wage demands than under floating rates.4 From this we can infer that workers who
enjoy a higher level of enfranchisement support floating exchange rates, which allow for
both wage adjustments and secure employment.5
Workers in the informal sector do not enjoy the benefits of enfranchisement.
However, many in the informal sector are, indeed, employed as wage earners without a
formal contract, so some do stand to gain from an expansion of aggregate demand
spurred by countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy (ECLAC, 2015). In addition,
informal-sector workers often run their own small-scale merchant operations and have
complete control over pricing, so they can adjust their prices to the rate of inflation,
which would make them more open to accept floating exchange rates. Nonetheless, those
working in the informal sector typically own few foreign assets and are primarily
occupied with their capacity to purchase needed goods and services, so their principal
concern is likely to be the protection of their real income. Thus, a higher rate of
informalization is expected to be associated with support for fixed exchange rates.

4

See Gruner and Hefeker (1999) for a review of literature on this topic. Most studies draw empirical
evidence from European countries and focus on the debate over what is now the Eurozone.
5
Another level of enfranchisement goes beyond basic social protections and unionization to include
various forms of democracy in the workplace, which Venezuela has promoted through Social Production
Enterprises, cooperatives, and worker control of state-owned companies. For an overview see El Troudi
(2010) and Ellner (2008, p. 121-129); for a critique, see Purcell (2011; 2014).
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Poverty and inequality also influence the general public’s preference. Poverty and
inequality overlap with issues of employment and enfranchisement, but for the sake of
simplicity, in this study they are considered matters of income distribution. People can
work full time and still be in poverty because the fruits of society’s labor are distributed
unequally. As a result, poverty and inequality threaten people’s security as consumers,
their ability to buy what they need. So, higher poverty and inequality are expected to
correspond to a greater preference for fixed exchange rates.
More powerful interest groups have more mechanisms of influence at their
disposal than the popular sectors: lobbying directly, launching high-profile issue-based
campaigns, using the media, contributing money through licit or illicit channels, landing
representatives in important positions in the government, and aligning with political
parties. Large firms, industry associations, and established parties are able to do all of
these things with greater clout. In addition, economic groups can massively disrupt
production by the flip of a switch, or they can subtly demonstrate their power by
changing investment decisions enough to indicate to policymakers how they might
respond to one or another policy decision. The lower classes, in contrast, are relatively
unorganized. Most individuals and small organizations have little disposable time and
money to dedicate to campaigns, own little property, and have little sway in the media
and political parties. The vote, the strike, and the public demonstration are their main
mechanisms of power.
The rise of the New Left has substantially altered the power dynamic among
interest groups because the popular sectors wield more power than in the past. New-left
governments give the poor more of a voice in the agenda. Leaders are more receptive and
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sympathetic and sometimes appoint representatives drawn from grassroots social
movements to high-level government posts. New-left governments have re-drawn
constitutions with greater human rights protections, enacted new labor laws, and
expanded social programs meant to benefit marginalized populations by redistributing
income, assets, and access to vital services. Formerly marginalized people now feel they
have a place in society and deserve protection of their rights. All of this augments the
importance of the general public in the overall balance of interest groups.
To summarize, this paper’s argument is that workers’ exchange rate policy
preference is the result of the interplay among diverse factors related to their roles as
employees and consumers. Higher unemployment is expected to increase the public’s
preference for floating rates; higher rates of poverty and inequality are expected to
increase the public’s preference for fixed rates. In the case of simultaneous
unemployment, poverty, and inequality, the balance-tipper is enfranchisement, which is
expected to increase the public’s preference for floating rates. Workers’ relevance as an
interest group is permanent and not limited to election cycles.
Independent Variable
The independent variable is the average policy preference of the relevant interest
groups. This is measured cross-sectionally, not longitudinally. Frieden uses a longitudinal
method to test whether interest-group size covaries with exchange rate policy choice over
time. He uses statistical techniques that control for the effect of other interest groups and
various macroeconomic and structural variables. In contrast, in this study, the
independent variable is the net balance of interest groups when the policy decision took
place in 2003.
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There exists no easy way to calculate the net balance of interest groups. Many
measurements indicate the absolute size of an interest group, but none adequately
captures the relative size or influence of interest groups. To illustrate, if foreign debt is
equal to 50% of GDP and manufacturing accounts for 25% of GDP, it does not mean that
foreign debt holders as an interest group are twice as strong as the manufacturing sector
as an interest group. If the financial sector employs five percent of the workforce and the
agricultural sector one fifth, the latter is not four times as strong as the former. The
popular sectors are the majority of the country, whether measured in terms of employees
as a portion of the workforce or household consumption as a portion of GDP, but average
workers and voters do not have preponderant control of policy decisions. No standardized
measures clearly predict which interest group ultimately tips the policy decision in its
favor. The net balance of interest groups must be teased out by combining contextual
evidence with imperfect proxy measurements drawn from descriptive statistics.6
This study accepts the following postulates. The first seven are drawn from
Frieden’s (2015) argument, and the eighth is based on the this study’s argument.
P1. Fixed rates are associated with stability, low inflation, and appreciation.
P2. Floating rates are associated with exchange rate fluctuation, higher inflation, and
depreciation.
P3. Interest groups prefer one policy over the other.
P4. This preference is conditioned by trade exposure, tradability of inputs and
outputs, and pass-through.

6

The Research Methods section below elaborates on the difficulties of measuring interest group influence.
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P5. Fixed rates are preferred by import merchants, importers dependent on tradable
inputs (mining, for example), international investors, and exporters of hightechnology goods.
P6. Floating rates are preferred by import-competing industries, investors with net
foreign-currency assets, and exporters of agricultural and manufactured goods.
P7. An interest group’s size is commensurate with its level of political influence.
P8. The policy preference of the lower classes is the result of the interplay among six
variables: the unemployment rate, the poverty rate, the Gini coefficient, the
distribution of national income by quintiles, union density, and the size of the
informal sector as a portion of the workforce. Unemployment and
enfranchisement motivate people to prefer floating rates; poverty and inequality
motivate people to prefer fixed rates.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the country’s chosen exchange rate policy in 2003. This
study uses the Reinhart-Rogoff de facto classification system for the sake of consistency
with Frieden, but this doesn’t really matter because in Brazil and Venezuela after 2003
the de jure, IMF official de facto, and Reinhart-Rogoff de facto classifications are the
same (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2002; Palma, 2011; IMF, 2014; Reinhart, 2016).
Lula’s choice upon taking office in 2003 was to maintain the managed floating
rate that he inherited. Starting in 1999, Brazil moved from a soft peg to a floating
exchange rate with an inflation-targeting monetary framework. In this system, the
government commits to use fiscal and monetary policy to keep the inflation rate within
designated limits. This is expected to stabilize the money supply and aggregate demand,
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which helps stabilize the exchange rate. This policy is a relatively conservative form of
the managed float because it curtails the government’s fiscal and monetary autonomy as a
fixed exchange rate would, although to a lesser degree. Throughout Lula’s two terms, real
interest rates averaged close to 40% (World Bank, 2016) and the public sector primary
surplus averaged 3.5% of GDP (ECLAC, 2016). These policies led to real appreciation;
the overvaluation of the Brazilian real reached as much as 80% when Lula left office
(Nassif, Feijo, and Araujo, 2011; ECLAC, 2016). The conservatism of Brazil’s managed
float matters because it suggests the policy was designed to serve the interests of diverse
groups by balancing the effects of floating and fixed rates.
Chávez’s choice in 2003, almost four years after taking office, was to switch from
a crawling band to a conventional peg.7 The bolivar was fixed to the dollar, and a system
called Cadivi controlled all dollar sales. These capital controls were expected to grant the
government more policy autonomy, and indeed, Chávez did not restrain monetary and
fiscal policy. Real interest rates averaged negative five percent throughout the rest of
Chávez’s time in office. The money supply and aggregate demand grew rapidly because
of a problematic process called “double monetization” in which dollars of oil revenue
were converted into bolivars twice: once when sold to the Central Bank and again when
spent by National Development Fund (Palma, 2011, p. 53). The capital controls were
gradually subverted by a thriving parallel dollar market. The official rate was devalued by
20% in 2004, by 12% in 2005, and by 21% and 100% in 2010 when it became a dual
fixed rate system. On the whole, Venezuela’s conventional peg after 2003 was far from
credible and stable.

7

Palma (2011) reveals the little-known fact that President Chávez enacted a floating exchange rate in
February 2002. The de facto classification, however, remained a crawling band.
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To summarize, the dependent variables in this study are Brazil’s choice of a
managed floating exchange rate, and Venezuela’s choice of a conventional peg.
However, Brazil’s policy has been implemented conservatively and Venezuela’s has been
implemented loosely, which has implications for the interest group dynamics behind the
policies.
Hypothesis
The hypothesis is that the average interest-group preference reflects the
government’s exchange rate policy choice. This hypothesis is tested twice. First, it is
tested while taking into account P1-P7 above, omitting P8. Second, it is tested while
taking into account all eight postulates, including the popular sectors’ policy preference.
If the outcome changes between the first and second tests, it means the workers’
exchange rate preference mattered in some way. If the hypothesis is rejected in the first
test and confirmed in the second, then it indicates that the government might have taken
into account the lower classes. If the hypothesis is confirmed in the first test and rejected
in the second, then it indicates the government might not have considered the lower
classes, or that this study’s theory of the lower classes’ preference is flawed.
Research Design
This paper uses the case study method. This method allows more attention to
detail, which is necessary to operationalize the cross-sectional independent variable. To
discern the net balance of interest groups requires both descriptive statistics, which
represent the size and composition of the interest groups, and a qualitative assessment of
the interest groups’ political influence. The case studies combine broad trends with
specific, contextual analysis. Ultimately, we will know the net balance of interest groups
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by looking at a combination of the historical trajectory of interest groups, developments
during the decade before the policy choice was made, and contextual political factors.
The case study method may also help to overcome the shortcomings in Frieden’s
theory that Frieden and his colleagues acknowledge (Broz, Frieden, and Weymouth,
2008, p. 432; Frieden, 2015, p. 215). One is endogeneity. Exchange rates and interest
groups are co-dependent: a powerful manufacturing sector compels the government to
choose flexible rates, but flexible rates also contribute to the rise of the manufacturing
sector, so the causal direction is ambiguous. Another form of endogeneity appears if
political institutions affect exchange rate policy choice, interest groups, or both, directly
or indirectly. A case study helps make sense of this amalgam of interrelated factors by
picking apart the details to interpret which variable caused which outcome in what order.
Existing research has also shown how difficult it is to measure interest groups.
Basing a sector’s strength on its portion of GDP implies that the intensity of that sector’s
lobbying rises with its role in the economy, yet it is fully possible that a sector’s decline
amidst unfavorable exchange rate policies could motivate it to exert power more
forcefully over decision makers. In such a case, the smaller the sector’s portion of GDP,
the greater the pressure it exerts in favor of its preferred policy – the opposite of what
most models predict. In another interpretation, the rise or fall of a sector as a portion of
GDP could simply reflect the precipitous rise or fall of another sector. This is where case
studies can provide a closer look and expose signs of the strength of a sector’s lobbying
despite its smaller size, or vice versa. To illustrate, in 1999, when Brazil switched to
floating rates, the manufacturing sector had experienced a multi-year decline. Judged
purely by its size as a portion of the economy, the manufacturing sector was weaker than

32

it had been a decade earlier. However, as Frieden and others note, Brazil’s manufacturing
sector was so powerful prior to the 1990s that a temporary downturn could not have
knocked it out entirely. Also, the sector had the powerful incentive of regaining its lost
status. Case studies help with measurement difficulties by reducing the need for
standardized measurements and allowing for contextual interpretation.
The case studies trace each country’s main interest groups during the entire
development experience of the 20th century. This is important because in Latin America
the foundational and path-defining experiences with exchange rates and interest groups
took shape over the course of the century. The case studies also detail the contours of
these interest groups during the entire decade before the New Left came to power, with
the intention of accurately articulating the configuration of social forces in the lead up to
2003.
The cases of Venezuela and Brazil were chosen for several reasons. First, these
two cases are widely cited as representing two distinct tendencies within the New Left.
Understanding their distinct interest-group compositions and exchange rate policy
choices can help scholars better understand the rise of the New Left. Also, the two cases
have a mixture of similarities and differences that make the outcome of the study hard to
predict. They both have among the highest in GDPs in the region and are highly exposed
to trade, benefitted from an export boom in the early years, suffered from the Dutch
Disease, and are now in crisis. But their interest group configurations have important
differences, not least of which is the presence of a powerful agricultural sector in Brazil.
Given their general political affinity and economic similarities and differences, why did
they choose different exchange rate policies?
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CHAPTER FOUR: BRAZIL
Brazil is one of the major economic and political powers in Latin America. With a
$2.25 trillion GDP (in current U.S. dollars), it is the world’s seventh-largest economy and
a member of the bloc informally known as the BRIC nations – Brazil, Russia, India, and
China.8 It is also the largest Latin American country, with a population of approximately
200 million and an abundance of natural resources. Despite its wealth, however, Brazil
remains one of the most unequal countries in the world. Vast portions of the population
inhabit the impoverished hillsides around the most prosperous cities, and even larger
portions of the rural population struggle to fulfill their basic needs. Any analysis of
interest groups in Brazil must navigate the contradictions of Brazil’s dual identity as a
poor and wealthy nation.
Brazilian Interest Groups and Exchange Rate Policies in the 20th Century
Interest groups have influenced economic policies, including exchange rate
policy, throughout modern Brazilian history.9 In the early 20th century, agricultural
exporters controlled the state. Import merchants and a small group of professionals linked
to the export sector also influenced policy. Policymakers prioritized international
comparative advantage over industrialization. The export economy, however, was highly
vulnerable to periodic downturns in external demand, leading to oversupply and declining
terms of trade. Debates over monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policy took center stage,
as two rival factions formed around distinct responses to the external shocks: the
papelista policy, in which the government stimulates the economy and devalues the
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The BRICs are nations that have GDPs above $1 trillion but remain outside the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).
9
For general background on economic interest groups in Latin American economic history, see Bértola and
Ocampo, 2012; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Bulmer Thomas, 2003; and Skidmore and Smith, 2005.
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currency through inflationary counter-cylical measures, and the metalista policy, which
prioritizes exchange rate stabilization, monetary restraint, and the payment of debts
(Singer, 2009, p. 60-61).
The Great Depression was an external shock so deep and enduring that it opened
an opportunity for a new configuration of economic groups to coalesce around policies
known as Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). Industrial capitalists and urban
laborers gained power relative to the agricultural exporters, financiers, and import
merchants. One major political battleground was access to foreign exchange, which
agricultural exporters controlled and the burgeoning industrial sector coveted. Thus an
intricate system of policies was established to protect and balance the interests of both
sectors: price subsidies buoyed agriculture, tariffs and quotas protected domestic
producers from foreign competition, a fixed exchange rate stabilized export prices and
facilitated capital goods imports, and inflationary monetary policy stimulated investment.
The national-populist state built the necessary political coalitions, created sector-specific
bureaucracies to coordinate production, regulated prices, invested in large-scale
infrastructure, and established state-owned firms.10
During the ISI era, which lasted through the 1960s, the general public advanced
slowly toward basic rights and economic protection. Brazil was a republic with semicompetitive elections, and the first laws were passed to protect the rights of industrial and
rural labor. In 1943, a corporatist labor system was consolidated, featuring a unitary
national labor administration, a single union for each economic sector, and a streamlined
financing structure with a mandatory contribution of one day’s wages per year (Hall,
2009, p. 151; Singer, 2009, p. 75). Due to the enduring power of the rural landowners,
10

For more on the interest group politics behind Brazil’s version of ISI see Furtado (1965).
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rural labor rights trailed behind industrial labor until the Rural Workers Statute of 1963
established wage protections, work contracts, and severance benefits (Garcia and
Palmeira, 2009, p. 38). In spite of these laws, workers continued to face repression,
abuse, and exploitation. Likewise, broader voter enfranchisement in 1946 was diluted by
systematic voter suppression through barriers to voting such as literacy tests, which
excluded half of the electorate (Pinheiro, 2009, p. 193).
The configuration of economic groupings shifted once again in the 1970s when
foreign capital increased its role in the economy through joint ventures with the state and
domestic industrialists. Brazil’s manufacturing sector had become a powerhouse, and
industry was double the size of agriculture as a portion of GDP, but the ISI model based
on internal savings was breaking down because of compounding problems of inflation,
trade deficits, and debt.11 Furthermore, according to Cardoso (1979), “the export sectors
never ceased to protest state intervention in exchange control and multiple exchange
rates” (p. 152). Three important shifts occurred. First, these export interests prevailed,
and industrial policies shifted toward export promotion rather than production for the
internal market. Second, the economy relied more on foreign savings, particularly FDI by
Multi-National Corporations (MNCs), which provided the advanced technology and
capital goods necessary to continue expanding production. The state continued to
participate directly in production, and it still accounted for more than half of all
investment in the early 1980s (Economist, 1983), but the alliance of interest groups
transformed from a national-populist ISI configuration to a “dependent capitalist” state
(Evans, 1979). This state “fused” with domestic and foreign firms in joint ventures that
succeeded in further developing industry (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979, p. 150-159).
11

See Baer (1972) for a full account of the unsustainability of the ISI model.
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Domestic producers bifurcated between the industries that had arisen under ISI and the
new industries that concentrated on capital goods and high-technology manufacturing
(Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Frischtak, 1986). The third major change was that a coup
d’état in 1964 ushered in a brutal dictatorship that violently broke the national-populist
political coalition by banning political parties, repressing labor, suppressing wages, and
conducting a dirty war of disappearances and state-sanctioned murder (MacLachlan
2003, p. 160).
External and internal forces pressured the dependent capitalist state, leading to the
next shift in the balance of power among interest groups. Externally, the oil shocks of the
1970s created a foreign payments imbalance. The dictatorship responded with heterodox
stabilization programs that were based on continued papelista stimulus and a crawling
peg exchange rate policy, but the economy never fully adjusted (Lamounier and Moura,
1986, p. 170-174; MacLachlan 2003, 140-150). Internally, labor unions used their
leverage in the strategic large-scale export industries to resurge in the 1980s. Led in part
by Lula, the future president, and the Workers Party he helped found in 1980, labor
unions resisted the dictatorship and shaped the transition to democracy marked by the
new 1988 constitution. General strikes rocked the country in 1989, and the number of
labor unions multiplied (Antunes, 2013).
With strong labor and a strong capitalist state, and no group willing to bear the
costs of economic adjustments, Brazil lacked the political coalitions necessary to bear the
financial shock induced by the hiking of interest rates by the U.S. Federal Reserve in the
early 1980s. Brazil’s exchange rate entered a de facto free-fall that culminated in
hyperinflation in the early 1990s (Reinhart, 2016). Several stabilization plans failed
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before the Real Plan of 1993 succeeded by combining a fixed exchange rate, a new
currency, de-indexation of wages, and fiscal austerity enacted by President Cardoso.
With this new configuration of interest groups, the dependent capitalist state
turned into a neoliberal political coalition. This was marked by a shift in the balance of
power among the three pillars of the dependent capitalist state: the state retreated, so
domestic capital lost much of its protection, and foreign capital gained the upper hand.
The policy consensus became what Bresser-Pereira (2009) calls “conventional
orthodoxy,” which combined “foreign exchange populism” with “rentiers and the
financial system that benefit from high interest rates” as well as “multinational
enterprises and rich countries’ interests represented by the multilateral agencies that
benefit from an overvalued local currency” (p. 16). By the mid-1990s, Brazil had
privatized many state-owned companies and banks, reformed the banking sector, deindexed wages and savings accounts, raised interest rates, lifted price controls, and
reformed key parts of the corporatist labor apparatus (MacLachlan 2003, 208-210; Coes,
2009; Singer 2009, 82-89). Brazil also moved to liberalize trade through the GATTWTO, the Latin American Free Trade Agreement, and other regional trade blocs
(MacLachlan 2003, 185-188).
The neoliberal political coalition shaped the configuration of interest groups in the
decade prior to Lula’s decision to maintain the floating exchange rate. The following
section provides details of the contours of that configuration.
Brazilian Interest Groups and Exchange Rate Policy 1993-2003
Lula took office amidst growing trade, implying greater pressure in favor of a
fixed exchange rate. In tandem with the economic reforms under the Cardoso
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administration, trade rose from 15.2% of GDP in 1990 to 27.6% in 2002, then remained
around a quarter of GDP during Lula’s administration. Even though this was small
compared to the regional average for trade, which hovered between 37 percent and 52
percent of GDP during the same time period, the increase was substantial. Measured in
terms of volume, Brazil’s exports grew almost every year between 1990-2013 (World
Bank, 2016).
Inflation was also a continuing concern when Lula took office. This would have
made fixed exchange rates unsustainable, pushing policy makers toward floating rates,
but it also suggests greater concern about the stability of the external sector, which would
increase pressure for fixed exchange rates. The Real Plan lowered annual inflation from
nearly 3000% in 1990 to 3.2% in 1998, but it did not completely restore Brazilians’ or
foreign investors’ confidence in the currency. Creeping real appreciation was worsened
by the Mexican and East Asian financial crises, which spooked investors. President
Cardoso implemented the float in January 1999, leading to devaluation and an increase in
inflation to 8.5% in 2002. It was widely expected that Lula’s election would make
international investors even more wary, and indeed, inflation spiked to 14.7% the year he
took office. So, when Lula was deciding on his initial exchange rate policy, he was under
great pressure to continue to facilitate trade and to control inflation.
The productive sector declined during the 1990s and was beginning to recover
when Lula took office. During the period 1993-2002, the sum of agriculture, mining, and
manufacturing as a portion of GDP declined from 25.2 percent to 19.6 percent. The
decline occurred mostly in the manufacturing sector, which dropped from a quarter of
GDP to 14.4 percent. Agriculture declined from 7.6 percent to 6.4 percent, and the
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mining sector held steady as a portion of GDP and even rose slightly as a portion of
exports (World Bank, 2016).
Another development in the productive sector was the reprimarization of exports.
This process was underway when Lula took office, and it continued throughout his term.
The primary and secondary sectors essentially switched places as a portion of total
exports. From 1993 to the end of Lula’s administration, agriculture and mining grew
from around 40 percent to nearly two-thirds of total exports, while manufactures dropped
from close to 60 percent to a little over one-third of exports. To put this in context,
primary exports as a portion of total exports had declined steadily from 97% in 1962 to a
low of 41.1% in 1993. The process of reprimarization has essentially reverted the
Brazilian productive apparatus to the same primary-to-secondary ratio as it had in the late
1970s and early 1980s (ECLAC, 2016). It also marks a turn backward toward the pre1930s liberal free trade model based on comparative advantage, rather than the statedirected industrialization model.
Reprimarization was accompanied by a rise in high-technology manufactures and
capital-intensive agriculture. High-technology manufactures increased from four percent
of manufactured exports in 1993 to 16 percent the year Lula was elected, and they
remained above ten percent throughout his administration. The main signal that
agriculture became more capital-intensive is that employment dropped from 27.4 percent
to 20.7 percent of total employment between 1993-2003, even while crop and food
production rose steadily, and food exports rose as a portion of total exports. Cereal
production rose from 32.5 million metric tons in 1990 to 50.9 million tons when Lula
took office, and by 2013 it had topped 100 million metric tons (World Bank, 2016). Both
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of these changes would have increased pressure for a fixed exchange rate, because
external demand for high-technology goods is less elastic, and capital-intensive
agriculture benefits from an appreciated currency to import needed inputs. Both prioritize
stability as their exposure to trade increases.
One might expect Brazil’s financial sector to be weak when Lula took office,
given that the financial sector was officially in crisis until 1998, according to the World
Bank. However, the sector recovered quickly and globalized before and during Lula’s
government. Financial system deposits were equal to 23.1% of GDP in 1993, 42.5
percent in 2003, and 55.7 percent in 2013. Foreign banks accounted for 22 percent of all
banks in 1995, 34 percent in 2003, and 40 percent in 2013 (World Bank, 2016). Foreign
debt had already fully recovered when Lula took office: it dropped from 36.2 percent of
GDP in 1993 to 20.7 percent in 1996, but then it steadily rose to 41.3% in 2002. This debt
was mostly privately held, with the public sector owning 38 percent of it the year Lula
took office (ECLAC, 2016).
FDI by MNCs, one of the three pillars of the dependent capitalist class alliance,
continued to grow in the late 1990s. Stocks of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) rose from
6.2 percent of GDP in 1994 to one fifth in 2002, then continued to grow to 33.3 percent
in 2013. In volume, FDI stock rose steadily from $54.6 billion in 1993 to $132.8 billion
in 2003 and $747.9 billion in 2013. Net FDI inflows in Brazil grew from about a third of
one percent of GDP in 1993 to more than 5 percent of GDP in 2000, then dropped and
averaged just over two percent during Lula’s government (World Bank; UNCTAD).
The lower classes felt both positive and negative effects of the changes after 1993.
The national poverty rate decreased over the decade prior to the Lula administration, as
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the Real Plan’s success in ending hyperinflation increased real incomes. Brazil’s official
figures show poverty dropping from 43 percent in 1993 to 35.8 percent in 2003 (ECLAC,
2016; World Bank, 2016). ECLAC calculations show poverty dropping from 45.1 percent
in 1993 to 38.7 percent in 2003. One caveat to the decline in poverty overall is that rural
poverty, which also declined, was approximately 50% higher than the national poverty
rate. Rural poverty was 62.9 percent in 1993 and 54.6 percent in 2003.
One of the costs of controlling inflation in the 1990s, however, was high
unemployment. The unemployment rate increased from from 5.4 percent in 1993 to 12.3
percent in 2003. Meanwhile, the Gini coefficient rose from 0.62 in 1993 to 0.64 in 1999,
then returned to .62 in 2003 when Lula took office. The richest quintile increased its
share of the national income from 57 percent in 1992 to 63 percent in 2002. The next four
quintiles suffered percentage-point declines of 2.73, 1.85, 1.04, and .23, respectively
(ECLAC, 2016).
Moreover, Brazil’s informal sector grew from 44.8 percent of non-agricultural
employment in 1992 to 46.6 percent in 2001 (World Bank, 2016). Employment in the
service sector grew from 50.8 percent of total employment in 1993 to 58.7 percent in
2003, which included an increase in employment in financial services from three to seven
percent of the workforce. This was mirrored by both agricultural employment, which
shrank from 28.3 percent in 1992 to 20.6 percent in 2002 (World Bank, 2016), and
manufacturing employment, which declined from 14.6 percent of total employment to
13.7 percent between 1993-2003. These shifts in the structure of employment
corresponded to further urbanization, as Brazil’s rural population declined from a quarter
of the population in 1990 to less than one fifth in 2000 (ECLAC, 2016).
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Labor, after its resurgence in the 1980s, did not completely lose steam under
neoliberalism: union density increased from 24.8 percent in 1992 to 26 percent in 2001
(IBGE, 2002, p. 29), and Brazil’s real manufacturing wage index grew by almost 30
percentage points between 1992-2002 (ILO, 2003). Despite this increase in union density,
however, other factors suggest unions actually lost power during the 1990s. First, union
density had been ten percentage points higher the previous decade: it increased from 34.8
percent to 38.1 percent during the 1980s before falling in the early 1990s (Blanchwater,
2006). Second, the average number of members per union declined from 2,149 in 1991 to
1,720 in 2001 (IBGE, p. 31). This suggests that the reform of the corporatist labor system
allowed more unions to form, but the cost was less effective coordination among unions.
Third, the unionization rate was highest in rural areas: it rose from 45 percent to 63
percent between 1991 and 2001, whereas urban union density remained constant at 17
percent during that decade. This suggests union density could drop if the decline in
agricultural employment and the shift toward urban, service-sector employment continue.
Interpretation
The evidence presented above indicates that the hypothesis is rejected in the case
of Brazil, whether or not the popular sectors are taken into account.
Before taking into account the popular sectors, the net balance of interest groups
in Brazil in 2003 falls on the side of fixed exchange rates. The macroeconomic
environment of growing trade and resurgent inflation would have motivated the entire
external sector to prefer a more stable exchange rate, even though sustaining a fixed rate
amidst high inflation is difficult. The main proponents of floating exchange rates,
manufacturers and agricultural producers involved in trade, were weak and only
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beginning to recover. Moreover, high-technology manufacturers and capital-intensive
agriculture were growing, suggesting that these sectors were becoming more amenable to
fixed exchange rates. And the mining sector, already reliant on imported capital goods
and thus more favorable to a fixed exchange rate, did not decline as the other sectors did.
Meanwhile, the financial sector expanded rapidly and became more foreign-owned. All
of these factors would have built up pressure for exchange rate stability and currency
appreciation, which are associated with fixed exchange rates.
When the lower classes are taken into account, the net balance of interest groups
in Brazil in 2003 still falls on the side of fixed exchange rates. The increase in
unemployment and the decrease in poverty indicate pressure for floating rates, but the
increase in both inequality and informality indicate pressure for fixed rates. Union
density is ambiguous: although it increased slightly, it was still low relative to the past,
and reforms to the corporatist labor system weakened labor in other ways. Overall, it
appears that a substantial portion of Brazil’s workforce would have preferred floating
rates and another substantial portion would have preferred fixed rates. From such an
ambiguous configuration, it is hard to discern the net preference of the popular sectors.
Even if we conclude that the net preference of the workers was for floating rates, this
would not counterbalance the decisive preference for fixed rates resulting from the
decline of manufacturing, the growth of agro-export industry, and the surge of the
financial sector.
Why was the hypothesis rejected? Lula’s widely-circulated “Letter to the
Brazilian People” in 2002, when he was a presidential candidate, may help answer this
question. The broad message of the letter is that both state-directed industrialization and
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neoliberalism have failed to bring development with social justice in Brazil. Brazilians,
the president writes, are tired of the clash of ideologies and want a new and inclusive way
forward. This new path will be characterized by the reconciliation among interest groups,
“a broad national negotiation that should lead to an authentic alliance for the country, a
new social contract, capable of ensuring growth with stability.” The letter addresses each
major interest group, attempting to assuage the group’s concerns while urging
pragmatism. To the financiers and multi-national investors, Lula promises to maintain
fiscal discipline and pay all public debts, but he explicitly denounces the “speculative
attack” and “artificial overvaluation” of the currency that hurt the economy in the 1990s.
To the productive sector, he says the path forward must include export-driven expansion
as well as strategic import substitution, but this cannot entail high inflation, and exporters
must submit to a rational system of taxes and customs. His message to the lower classes
is more complex. On the one hand, he acknowledges that the lower classes have always
been excluded from the development process, and he repeatedly calls for social justice.
On the other hand, he emphasizes that due to economic structural pressures beyond his
control, “the margin of political maneuvering in the short term is small.” He makes the
modest pledge to avoid crisis, restore stability by controlling inflation, resume economic
growth, and make government more efficient and transparent – things he casts as being in
the interest of the popular sectors.
Overall, Lula’s letter is a call for balance. “Another path is possible,” he writes,
playing on the slogan of the World Social Forum. “That is the path of economic
development with stability and social responsibility” – indeed, a program that balances
the interests of producers, financiers, the lower classes. His choice of exchange rate
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policy could be interpreted through this lens. Although the balance of interest groups
tipped toward stability and fixed rates, Brazil’s perennial inflation problem and investors’
lack of confidence made it doubtful a fixed exchange rate could be sustained for long. As
Lula said, he had little space to maneuver, so he attempted to make the floating exchange
rate as stable and predictable as possible through zealous fiscal and monetary restraint,
while still preserving the flexibility to have a competitive exchange rate conducive to
export expansion and employment.
This interpretation has two important implications. One is that it casts doubt on
the postulate that fixed exchange rates are the most stable. In Brazil and other emerging
and developing economies, which are more vulnerable to capricious financial
speculation, the fixed exchange rate might be even less stable than a well-managed
floating exchange rate. The second implication is that the developments in Brazilian
manufacturing during the 1990s raise the question of endogeneity. The neoliberal reforms
that hurt manufacturing were enacted when manufacturing was relatively strong, and the
switch to floating rates that helped manufacturing occurred when the sector was relatively
weak. This presents a conundrum: did the manufacturing sector influence exchange rate
policy, or did exchange rate policy influence manufacturing? Future research should
address this question.
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CHAPTER FIVE: VENEZUELA
The interest groups in Venezuela are similar to those in Brazil: rural landowners,
financiers, import merchants, domestic industry, multi-national companies, unions, and
the urban poor. However, the interplay among these groups and their influence on
exchange rate policy followed a different trajectory, mainly because of the predominant
role of oil in the Venezuelan economy.
Venezuelan Interest Groups and Exchange Rate Policies in the 20th Century
Perhaps the most significant shift in the interest-group configuration in Venezuela
in the 20th Century was the decline of agricultural exporters. Before the expansion of the
oil economy, the Venezuelan economy was mostly agricultural, and coffee and cacao
were the principal exports. The turn toward minerals began with the extraction of asphalt
and the production of kerosene in the 1870s and 1880s. Oil concessions were granted
between 1907 and 1912, mainly to domestic companies that were later acquired by
foreign companies such as Royal Dutch Shell (Rodríguez Araque, 2007, p. 40-41). Oil
production increased greatly after the discovery of a major oil well in 1922. By 1950, oil
accounted for nearly all export revenue, while agriculture declined from one third to one
tenth of GDP (Wilpert, 2007, p. 10).
Parallel to the decline in agriculture was the gradual centralization of power. In
the 19th century, political power was brokered regionally through caudillos, or
charismatic strongmen. In the early 20th century, the dictator Juan Vicente Gómez
consolidated power in a national army and established a sovereign, unified state with the
capacity to tax, control the territory, and, most importantly, administer mining
concessions (Hellinger, 1991, p. 36).
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Without a powerful agricultural exporter group, Venezuela’s political landscape
differed markedly from that of its South American neighbors. This sector’s weakness had
both political and economic ramifications. It was the state, not the rural or industrial
elites, that controlled the modern sector of the economy. This landlord state charged rent
on access to the subsoil, and the struggle over this rent was the hub of politics. At first,
the Gómez dictatorship and the rural landowners struggled over two alternative systems
for allocating ground rent: either the private landowners had the right to the subsoil, or
the state had control, or some compromise had to be reached. Although the early mining
laws granted some subsoil rights to the private landowners, the state eventually prevailed
and established a monopoly on the subsoil (Hellinger, 1991, p. 41), then it used this
leverage to negotiate higher taxes and royalties on foreign oil companies. In contrast to
the Brazilian national-populist state, which had to negotiate with agricultural exporters
for access to foreign exchange earnings, the Venezuelan landlord state had a steady
supply of foreign exchange earnings that were sufficient to sustain an appreciated
exchange rate over the long term. This led to what is sometimes called a “Dutch disease,”
where the influx of foreign earnings and the appreciated currency boost demand and
cheapen imports, which diverts consumption toward imports, investment toward the oil
sector, and economic activity toward import commerce, while the less profitable
domestic industries wane.12
Even though business groups in Venezuela neither dominated the state nor led the
development process, these groups retained a powerful role in society. By some
measures, business was booming: as the world’s top oil exporter for several decades,
12

Saad-Filho and Weeks (2013) argue this was a policy error, not a “disease”, but they do not deny the
effect of the appreciated currency on domestic producers, which is the main concern of this study of
interest groups and exchange rate policy.
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Venezuela’s GDP growth was among the highest in the region. The rural landowners
started family-based business empires in diverse sectors including finance, import
commerce, communications, food manufacturing, utilities, transportation, and
construction. These industry groups relied on close relationships with state bureaucrats to
obtain capital and imported inputs, and private business interests competed with one
another for access to state funds (Ortiz, 2004, p. 75). Business leaders formed the
Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Production of Venezuela (FEDECAMARAS)
in 1944, a group that six decades later would play a crucial role in Chávez’s exchange
rate policy decision.
Workers, peasants, and the middle class also entered the political game during
Venezuela’s rise as an oil economy. A major driver of this change was urbanization
fueled by the investment of oil revenue in urban infrastructure: urban areas were home to
the majority of the population by 1950 and three quarters of the population by 1975
(ECLAC, 2016). Labor unions in the oil sector launched a major strike in 1936, the year
the first labor law was passed, and soon after the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers
(CTV) was formed – another group that would later clash with Chávez. The rural poor
were also active in demonstrations and land occupations, calling for the confiscation of
lands accumulated by Gómez during his rule. In addition, middle-class professionals tied
to the oil sector, public bureaucracies, small-scale crafts, construction, and domestic
service increased as a share of the economy.
These interest groups’ alignment with the state shifted as Venezuela passed from
dictatorship to a republic. The dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez during the 1950s
aligned with foreign oil companies, investors, and magnates in the domestic construction
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and service sectors, while excluding domestic industry leaders from industrial projects
financed by state-owned corporations (Hellinger, 1991, p. 88). In contrast, the political
parties Democratic Action (AD) and the Independent Electoral Political Organizing
Committee (COPEI), which struggled to establish a republic, favored a populist political
program that included at least a fifty percent share of oil profits for the state, import
substitution in which domestic businesses played an active role, stricter enforcement of
labor laws, agrarian reform, and investment in education and health (Hellinger, 1991, p.
54-58). As Collier and Collier (1991) point out, the inclusion of both industrial and rural
labor in this populist pact distinguished Venezuela from Brazil, where corporatism was
established under an authoritarian regime and rural labor was largely excluded. However,
AD and COPEI were not all-inclusive: when pressured to choose between
FEDECAMARAS and the Venezuelan Communist Party, both of which had fought the
dictatorship, they aligned with the former and explicitly excluded the latter (Ellner, 2008,
p. 61).
Exchange rates and the configuration of interest groups both were central to the
consolidation and disastrous disintegration of Venezuela’s republic between 1958-1998.
During the consolidation, marked by a political accord known as the Punto Fijo pact
signed in 1958, policymakers struggled to balance the ever-expanding mix of interest
groups. Their policy tools included taxes, which regulated the foreign and domestic
business sectors’ share of the oil wealth; public spending, which regulated the lower
classes’ share; and laws on labor and agrarian reform. The exchange rate policy
complemented all of these other policies. It was kept fixed and appreciated, so it
facilitated imports of both capital goods, which appealed to business, and consumer
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goods, which increased the living standards of the general public (Rodríguez Araque,
2007, p. 14).
This exchange rate policy collapsed amidst the windfall oil profits created by the
oil price shocks in the late 1970s. With the transfer of ownership of the oil industry to the
national holding company PDVSA, the pressure to distribute the windfall rents led to a
large fiscal expansion, which, when combined with a fixed exchange rate, caused real
appreciation and contributed to the failure of state-financed industrialization projects that
were intended to diversify the economy. The temptation to spend to satisfy interest
groups motivated government officials to sidestep built-in policy controls, such as the
Venezuelan Investment Fund, which was meant to sequester savings abroad to avoid
over-expansion of the money supply and to prepare for the cyclical decline in oil
revenues. Even though Venezuela ran trade surpluses during those years, it accumulated
large and unsustainable foreign debts. The crisis culminated in 1983 with the public
announcement of the end of the fixed exchange rate, the implementation of currency
controls to protect foreign reserves, and devaluation of the currency. Venezuela had a
crawling peg with multiple rates until 1989, when President Carlos Andrés Pérez
announced the switch to floating rates along with structural adjustment reforms.
The crisis devolved into chaos after Pérez’s announcement. The urban poor,
enraged by both economic hardship and the perception of corruption and betrayal by
political leadership, swarmed the streets. Property was defaced and stores were thrashed
and robbed. Pérez ordered the police to fire on the rioters to restore order, and by official
figures, several hundred were massacred. The significance of this event for Chávez’s rise
and policy decisions cannot be underestimated: it showed that the Punto Fijo leaders were
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not on the side of the poor majority. Also, in the popular mindset it symbolically linked
floating exchange rates and devaluation directly to the corruption and state failure that
drove Venezuela’s oil boom to a bust.
The Caracazo symbolized a broader awakening of the popular sectors, leading to
new forms of social protest and political engagement. People formed neighborhood
associations that later came together into a broader Federation of Urban Community
Associations. A leftist union movement began agitating for worker control of factories
and workplaces, led by the Central United Venezuelan Workers Confederation, which
was independent from the CTV. And at the municipal level, a new political party, La
Causa R, won elections and represented an alternative to the Punto Fijo political
establishment (Hellinger, 1991, p. 168; McCoy and Myers, 2004, p. 98-100).
To review, during the 20th century, Venezuela’s agricultural sector was replaced
by a sovereign landlord state that drove the development process in collusion with the
private business sector. The state used its control of the subsoil to increase its share of the
oil wealth by taxing foreign companies. Oil-sector workers and rural laborers were
incorporated into a populist pact called Punto Fijo. The leaders of this pact, however,
mismanaged the windfall oil profits and nationalization of the oil industry, over-investing
and over-spending to the point of utter collapse. In response, a variety of grassroots
organizations and social movements increased political engagement.
Venezuelan Interest Groups and Exchange Rate Policy 1993-2003
In 1993, Venezuela’s GDP was roughly equal to its GDP in 1963 (Baptista,
1997).13 This massive retrogression led to deep shifts in the balance among interest
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groups during the 1990s. Most notably, the private business sector steadily declined,
while the popular sectors increased their political engagement. Chávez at first tried to
forge alliances with both groups, but the attempted coup d’état and political unrest in
2002-2003 showed these interests to be incompatible, leaving Chávez to realign himself
with the urban poor, small business sector, and a portion of the unionized workforce.
Similar to Brazil, Venezuela had to balance the desire for stable trade, for which
fixed rates are beneficial, with the reality of high inflation, which tends to make fixed
rates unsustainable, and the need to remain competitive, for which a floating exchange
rate is preferable. In contrast to Brazil, agriculture is not part of this equation. Agriculture
dropped to just 3.8 percent of GDP in 2002 – the lowest in South America (ECLAC,
2016). Oil comprised between three quarters and 99 percent of exports over the prior four
decades (World Bank, 2016). Because oil prices are highly volatile, trade as a portion of
GDP is volatile. Natural resource rents bounced from 36.5 percent of GDP in 1990 to
21.9 percent in 1995, 33.4 percent in 1996, and 15.3 percent in 1998. During that same
period, trade (exports plus imports) fluctuated between 40 percent and 60 percent of
GDP. Meanwhile, inflation was high but never reached the point of hyperinflation: it rose
from 40.7 percent in 1990 to a peak of 100 percent in 1996. It dropped to 23.6 percent
when Chávez took office in 1999, but then rose to 38 percent amidst the unrest in 2003
(World Bank, 2016; ECLAC, 2016).
One counterintuitive feature of the 1990s in Venezuela is the rise of the secondary
sector as a portion of both exports and GDP. The primary sector accounted for 98 percent
of exports from the 1960s through the early 1980s, but then it dropped to 81.5 percent in
1998. Meanwhile, manufactures rose from 10.4 percent of exports in 1990 to 18.5 percent
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in 1998, and then averaged 11.5 percent during Chávez’s first four years in office
(ECLAC, 2016). As a portion of GDP, value added in manufacturing grew from 15
percent to 23.2 percent in 1997 and then hovered around 19 percent during Chávez’s first
four years in office (World Bank, 2016). Although some of the growth in manufacturing
as a portion of the economy may be attributed to the relative decline of oil prices,
manufactures also grew in volume and in absolute market value during that time. The
manufactured exports were mostly metals produced by SIDOR, the steel company
created by the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship that was privatized in the mid-1990s;
ALCASA, the state-owned aluminum company; and chemical products linked to the oil
sector (Muñiz, 1998, p. 94). The secondary sector’s share of total employment dropped
by five percentage points even as the sector grew, however, partially as a result of
neoliberal reforms focused on efficiency. High-tech manufactures made up just 2.8
percent of manufactured exports on average between 1990-2013 (World Bank, 2016).
The rise of manufacturing should not be mistaken for a strengthening of the
private business sector. According to Ortiz (2004), Venezuela’s family-based business
empires dwindled after 1983, and by 2002, only one remained on the list of Latin
America’s five hundred largest companies (p. 72). Business owners made fortunes
acquiring assets abroad prior to the repeated devaluations of the bolivar, but these
fortunes were not channeled toward investment in the country. President Pérez’s group of
favored business insiders, known as the “12 Apostles”, provoked divisions within the
business community, as emerging entrepreneurs from the country’s interior challenged
the traditional elites who had controlled FEDECAMARAS since the 1940s. New rivalries
manifested themselves in competition over ownership of the largest banks and media
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companies as well as competition for political influence. With the neoliberal reforms in
the 1990s, which dismantled much of the protectionist, state-led developmentalist
framework, private business lost the influence that had been integral to its success during
the Punto Fijo era.
The financial sector fared no better. Venezuela was in a banking crisis from 19941998. This was partly the result of over-leveraging amidst the heightened business
confidence galvanized by the neoliberal reforms (Ortiz, 2004, p. 81). It was also the result
of the accumulation of bad loans prior to the neoliberal reforms, when interest rates were
low or negative, as well as poor banking oversight (Palma, 2011). The trigger was the
political unrest caused by two coup attempts in 1992 – one of them led by Colonel Hugo
Chávez, the future president. This reduced the availability of foreign capital. 19 of the
nation’s most prominent banks collapsed, and seven were nationalized, while the total
number of bank offices in the country was cut exactly in half (Muñiz et al., 1998). The
banks had become partial owners of corporations, as well, so the financial crisis led to
widespread business failure (Ortiz, 2004, p. 83-84). All in all, financial system deposits
declined from 33.1 of GDP in 1991 to 14.2 percent in 2002 (World Bank, 2016).
With the decline of Venezuelan business and finance, foreign capital increased its
share of the economy. The two highest-profile companies that were privatized, the
telecommunications company CANTV in 1996 and the steel company SIDOR in 1997,
were sold not to Venezuelan companies but to multi-nationals. Of the seven major banks
nationalized during the financial crisis that were re-privatized in 1996 and 1997, four
were acquired by Spanish, Chilean, and Colombian corporations. Foreign banks made up
just ten percent of total banks in 1995, but this figure rose to 28 percent by 2002 (World
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Bank, 2016). The volume of foreign debt remained steady at around $40 billion
throughout the decade (ECLAC, 2016), but the volume of FDI stocks grew rapidly from
$3.9 billion in 1990 to $45.6 billion in 2006 (UNCTAD, 2016). FDI stock as a portion of
GDP rose from 8.2 percent in 1990 to 50 percent in 2003. FDI net inflows grew from less
than one percent in the early 1990s to more than four percent in the year 2000. (World
Bank, 2016).
The oil sector was also opened to foreign investment during the 1990s, weakening
the state’s international bargaining power in its core area of strength. One key factor was
that the management operated the state oil company, PDVSA, as a private, for-profit
firm, using transfer pricing to keep profits abroad and switching accounting methods to
reduce taxes paid to the government. But the main political issue at stake was the
opening, known as la apertura, which included the contracting out of oil production and
the negotiation of joint operations with foreign companies (Wilpert, 2007, p. 87-93).
Opponents of this process, including new political parties like La Causa R, testified
before the parliament that they supported la apertura as a means to develop the national
productive apparatus, but they opposed clauses in the new joint operations contracts that
implied a transfer of ownership to foreign companies, which encroached upon the state’s
constitutional right to sovereignty over its subsoil (Rodríguez Araque, 2007, p. 65).
The standard of living of the lower classes declined during the 1990s.14 The
unemployment rate grew from 6.6 percent in 1993 to 18 percent in 2003. Approximately
half the population, and possibly more, was in poverty. ECLAC’s calculations show that
the poverty rate was 37.3 percent in 1992 and 48.5 percent in 2002; Venezuela’s official
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figures show an increase in poverty from 54.5 percent in 1997 to 62.1 percent in 2003
(ECLAC, 2016). The inflation of the 1990s also took its toll, reducing the purchasing
power of wages to a twenty-year low (McCoy and Myers, 2004, p. 207). Income
inequality increased, with the Gini coefficient rising from .486 in 1994 to .50 in 2002.
The richest quintile of the population increased its share of the national income from 48
percent in 1992 to 54 percent in 2002. Each of the other four quintiles declined, but not
equally: the poorest quintile’s portion decreased from 4.82 percent in 1992 to 2.59
percent in 2002 – a 2.23 percentage point drop – whereas the three middle quintiles
declined by less than two percentage points each (ECLAC, 2016).
Worker enfranchisement also declined over the two decades prior to the 2003
decision. One way to confirm this is to infer that the shift of employment away from
traditionally unionized sectors led to a reduction in unionization. Public-sector
employment, which was always largely unionized, dropped from 18 percent to 13.8
percent of the workforce, and private-sector employment declined from 49 percent to 41
percent during the same period. Meanwhile, the informal sector grew from 44 percent of
the workforce in 1994 to 58 percent in 2002, and the self-employed as a portion of the
workforce grew from 25.2 percent in 1992 to 40 percent in 2002.
Employment in the primary and secondary sectors declined overall. Employment
in manufacturing decreased from 16.2 percent of total employment in 1992 to 11.7
percent in 2002 (ECLAC, 2016), and Venezuela’s real manufacturing wage index
decreased by almost 25 percentage points between 1990 and 2002 (ILO, 2003).
Employment in agriculture declined from 11 percent in 1992 to ten percent in 2003
(ECLAC, 2016; World Bank, 2016). Consistent with this trend, the rural population
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continued its downward historical trajectory, decreasing from 16 percent to 12 percent of
the national population during the 1990s. The decline in the productive sectors was
counterbalanced by the growth of the service sector from 62.4 percent of the workforce in
1993 to 69 percent in 2003 (World Bank, 2016). This growth was mostly in trade and
other services; employment in financial services declined from six to five percent
between 1992 and 2002 (ECLAC, 2016).
The clearest indication of the decline in worker enfranchisement is the drop in
union density, although data are scarce. A patchwork of estimates show a decline in the
rate of union membership from 33 percent in 1975 to 18 percent for the period 19801985, and finally to 13.5 percent in 1995 (Schütt, 2008; Blanchflower, 2006). Certain
sectors were more highly unionized. According to estimates from the CTV and the
Ministry of Labor, an estimated 55 percent of industrial workers and 75 percent of oil and
mining sector workers were unionized in the late 1970s (Hellinger, 1991, p. 178). With
the decline of both the public sector and the manufacturing sector in the wake of the 1983
fiscal crisis and the 1994 banking crisis, coupled with the increased informality of the
workforce overall, unionization declined. Developments at SIDOR after its privatization
in 1996 are indicative of this trend: SIDOR’s workforce of 12,000 full-time employees
gradually transformed into a workforce of 4,000 employees and 9,648 non-unionized
contract workers (Suggett, 2008).
Finally, Chávez’s exchange rate decision in 2003 was greatly influenced by the
interest-group dynamics during his early years in office that led up to the attempted coup
in April 2002 and the general strike in late 2002 and early 2003. As Wilpert (2007),
Ellner (2008), and Eastwood (2011) point out, Chávez at first had some support from
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wealthy business leaders, and his policies were relatively moderate during his first two
years in office. However, he did challenge the traditionally dominant interest groups in
several ways. First, he did not appoint business leaders to key ministerial posts that they
were accustomed to controlling. Second, he passed a new Hydrocarbons Law that
curtailed la apertura and a new Lands Law that permitted the state to forcibly purchase
lands. Third, he initiated the re-writing of the national constitution by an elected
constituent assembly, a project opposed by the Punto Fijo elites. And finally, he led an
effort to replace the CTV, which opposed his government, through a national referendum.
As a result of these actions, a tenuous alliance between FEDECAMARAS and the CTV
formed, and these groups led the effort to overthrow Chávez in 2002 and to shutdown the
economy in early 2003. These groups’ failure to oust Chávez demonstrated their
weakness relative to the popular sectors (excluding the CTV), who backed Chávez.
However, the coup and general strike did cause GDP to drop and unemployment to rise.
And since Venezuela had a floating exchange rate at the time, the political instability led
to large-scale capital flight. Stopping this capital flight was one of Chávez’s immediate
objectives when he implemented capital controls along with the fixed exchange rate.
Interpretation
The evidence presented above indicates that the hypothesis is confirmed in the
case of Venezuela, whether or not the popular sectors are taken into account.
Before considering the popular sectors, the net balance of interest groups in
Venezuela in 2003 falls on the side of fixed exchange rates. The country’s reliance on
trade in one volatile commodity placed structural pressure in favor of fixed exchange
rates. In the productive sector, the sectors that favor floating rates, including agriculture

59

and most manufactured goods (apart from steel, aluminum, and chemicals), were small
and weak; the sectors that favor fixed rates, including oil and the capital-intensive basic
industries, were dominant. The financial sector had collapsed, taking many businesses
with it, but the foreign-owned portion of the financial sector surged. The increased role of
MNCs in the oil sector during the 1990s also would have increased pressure toward fixed
rates. Therefore, the conclusion is that the net configuration of interest groups in
Venezuela in the year 2003 showed a preference for fixed rates, and this matches the
Chávez government’s exchange rate choice.
After taking into account the lower classes, the net balance of interest groups in
Venezuela in 2003 still falls on the side of fixed exchange rates. The high rate of
unemployment implies pressure for a floating exchange rate. However, this is more than
counterbalanced by the decline in worker enfranchisement and the large increase in both
poverty and inequality. Therefore, the net preference of the popular sectors was a fixed
exchange rate.
One thing that is striking about this case study is that even the intense political
instability in 2002-2003 did not alter the result. That is, the extreme weakness of
FEDECAMARAS and the CTV after the coup and general strike was consistent with the
steady decline in the private business sector and the unionized workforce during the
1990s. However, it would be inaccurate to try to explain Chávez’s policy choice without
placing it squarely in the context of this political battle with the traditional power groups.
This is because his policy stance was more moderate in the years before the coup. It is
imaginable that if the coup and general strike had not happened – if the traditional power
groups had been more conciliatory toward Chávez – then Venezuela would have
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remained on a floating exchange rate or crawling peg and achieved a renewed expansion
of domestic industry. Had this occurred, this study’s hypothesis would have been rejected
in the case of Venezuela, casting serious doubt on existing theories of how interest
groups influence exchange rate policy choice.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS
This study explored the impact of interest groups on the choice of exchange rate
policy in Brazil and Venezuela. It hypothesized that the exchange rate policy choice in
2003 in both Brazil and Venezuela reflected the interest group configuration at the time
of the decision. To define the exchange rate policy preferences of major business groups,
it drew on seven postulates from existing research. It then proposed a theory of the
exchange rate policy preference of the workers, with the intention of amending existing
theories, which over-simplify and marginalize the role of the lower classes in general.
The study tested its hypothesis twice. The first test considered only the dominant interest
groups. The second test considered the dominant interest groups as well as the popular
sectors. The study used a cross-sectional case study method to define the net
configuration of interest groups in early 2003, drawing on detailed data from the decade
prior to the decision as well as broad data from the 20th century.
The hypothesis was rejected in the case of Brazil, and taking into account the
popular sectors did not change this result. Growing trade and resurgent inflation put all
those involved in the external sector on edge and increased concern about stability. A
weak manufacturing sector, an agricultural sector more dependent on imported capital
goods, and increasing trade in high-technology manufactures reduced the competitiveness
incentive for floating rates. An enlarged, globalized financial sector augmented pressure
for a fixed exchange rate. Meanwhile, the preference of the workers was ambiguous. Two
indicators pointed toward a preference for floating exchange rates (higher unemployment
and lower poverty), and two indicators suggested a preference for fixed exchange rates
(inequality and informality). The potential balance-tipper was union density. Although
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union density had increased slightly over the previous decade, it was still at a lower level
than the past, and neoliberal legislation implied a weakening of unions in the 1990s.
Therefore, the ambiguous preference of the general public combined with the strong
leaning of the rest of the interest groups toward a fixed exchange rate tipped the net
balance toward a fixed exchange rate.
The hypothesis was confirmed in the case of Venezuela, and taking into account
the lower classes did not change this result. Volatile trade, high inflation, an utterly
disintegrated private business sector, a dominant and capital-intensive oil and mining
sector, and a surge in FDI and foreign takeovers of banks all pointed toward fixed
exchange rates. Only one indicator of the popular sectors’ preference pointed toward
floating rates (high unemployment), whereas declining enfranchisement and growing
poverty and inequality indicated a greater preference for fixed exchange rates. Therefore,
the net balance of interest groups pointed toward a preference for a fixed exchange rate.
Broader Implications and Avenues for Future Research
These results have four important implications for interest-group theories of
exchange rate policy choice.
First, although incorporating workers’ policy preferences did not change the
study’s results, it did make the explanation of the governments’ exchange rate policy
choices more complete. It is possible that the popular sectors are simply irrelevant to
exchange rate policy choice, but it is also possible that in other countries or in the same
countries at different times they would be more relevant. Future case studies could help
explore this further. Future research on this topic should consider the possibility that the
theory of the workers’ exchange rate policy preferences proposed in this study is flawed,
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and they should strive to find a nuanced, accurate assessment of what policy the popular
sectors prefer.
Second, it is important to supplement large-N longitudinal analysis with crosssectional case studies, because too much valuable information is lost when relying solely
on inferential statistics. The discrepancy in findings between this study and Frieden
(2015) with respect to the Brazilian manufacturing sector illustrates this point.
Third, the eight postulates listed above should not necessarily be taken for
granted. For example, since there is convincing evidence that fixed rates can lead to
exchange rate instability when combined with expansionary monetary and fiscal policy
and speculative financial flows, it may be wrong to assume that fixed rates are associated
with stability and low inflation.15 Likewise, since nuanced analysis shows that interest
groups face complex tradeoffs that depend on multiple contextual factors, it may be
wrong to assume that entire economic sectors prefer one policy over another.
Manufacturers with tradable inputs and outputs, financiers with highly diversified
portfolios, and unionized workers in volatile industries may conclude that the costs and
benefits of fixed and flexible rates balance each other out. On a broader level, Latin
American countries often depend on both capital imports and export revenue, so they
stand to benefit to some degree from both fixed and floating rates. Furthermore, it is
probable that the interest group’s size as a portion of GDP is a poor proxy for its
influence over policymakers, so researchers should seek better measurements.

15

Hefeker (1996) hits this point precisely: “Why should a policy of pegging to a low-inflation currency be
more reliable than a policy of maintaining a low growth rate for the domestic money stock under a regime
of floating rates?” (p. 361). This also echoes the thesis that exchange rate policies are often a “mirage” in
developing countries (see Calvo and Mishkin, 2003).
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Finally, future studies should take into account institutions and government
ideology. Lula took office in the midst of growing institutionalization and
decentralization of power with the aid of an established political party, which constrained
his individual ability to maneuver. Chávez, in contrast, took office amidst the institutional
disintegration of the old regime, on the wings of an ad hoc electoral party in which he
was the central figure. This allowed him to lead fast-paced, radical institutional change,
and his exchange rate policy was a crucial lever of control over the oil earnings that
financed that change. Institutional and ideological factors should complement interestgroup politics as part of a comprehensive explanation of exchange rate policy choice.
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